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Representing the Riots: The (mis)use of 
statistics to sustain ideological explanation 
Roger Ball and John Drury 
Introduction 
In this article, we critically analyse the use of figures that were 
employed implicitly, or sometimes explicitly, to support two kinds of 
quasi-psychological accounts of the UK riots2
These two kinds of accounts echo traditional convergence and 
submergence explanations for riots in academic psychology, which 
have been shown to be both inaccurate and ideological. In principle, it 
is possible, of course, that the riots of August 2011 were indeed 
characterized by the convergence of ‘uncivilized’ individuals and by 
indiscriminate attacks on property. But we shall show that the figures 
used to support these claims were deeply problematic. Commentators, 
including government ministers, misinterpreted some of the patterns 
they found (e.g., in the arrest and criminal records statistics); they 
also overlooked certain other patterns that could be discerned in the 
data (e.g., of discrimination in violence) because of imprecision in their 
coding categories. 
 of August 2011. The first 
kind of account suggested that that, overwhelmingly or typically, the 
rioters were a specific category of individual distinguished from others 
by their lack of civilization. For example, there were claims about the 
family upbringing of those involved, their alleged membership of a 
distinct cultural ‘underclass’, their gang membership, and their 
criminal characters. The second kind of account focused on the 
psychological effects of being in a (rioting) crowd. It suggested that the 
crowd leads people to lose their senses and lose control of their 
behaviour, and therefore to commit acts of mindless and 
indiscriminate violence.  
 
Before demonstrating how figures were (mis)used, we will briefly 
indicate some of the history of the two types of ideological explanation. 
                                                 
2 Thompson (1971) cautions us against loose employment of the term ‘riot’; we agree that 
the associations of this word may serve to obscure the significance of what for some might 
instead be called an ‘uprising’. The term is also used sometimes to group together events 
which are quite different (Aufheben, 2011). We shall bracket off these discussions for the 
present analysis, however, which seeks to understand and criticize the way that facts are 
constructed in explanations for events that are widely described by almost all sources as 
‘riots’. 
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Convergence and submergence: Two ideological 
explanations for riots 
The suggestion that violent crowd behaviour reflects the ‘uncivilized’ 
character of participants - the ‘riff-raff’ explanation (US riot 
commission, 1966) - has been around at least since the early 19th 
century (Rudé, 1995). It found scientific expression in the 
psychological theories of Lombroso, Sighele and Floyd Allport (Drury & 
Stott, 2011) who argued that if crowd behaviour in riots was violent, 
criminal and destructive, it was because the individuals involved had 
violent, criminal and destructive predispositions.  
In contrast to this suggestion that in riots (criminal) individuals do 
what they normally do anyway3
Despite their continued popularity in some circles,
 was the argument that the individual 
becomes ‘submerged’ in the crowd and their personality replaced by a 
collective ‘racial unconscious’. In this account, the loss of self (and 
hence of self-control) and the primitive impulses of the ‘group mind’ 
lead typically to indiscriminate violence and irrational self-destruction. 
The notion of an underlying barbarity in all humanity is clearly 
Hobbesian in its provenance, but was developed into ‘crowd science’ 
by Taine and Tarde and popularized by Le Bon (Stott & Drury, in 
press).  
4
As well as being falsified by the research evidence, convergence and 
submergence accounts are also both profoundly ideological in their 
implications. Thus, as Fogelson (1971) argues in a stinging critique of 
‘riff raff’ accounts, attributing riots to the characters of the individual 
 convergence and 
submergence explanations are not supported by the evidence. Thus, 
studies have consistently demonstrated that participants are more 
likely to be socially integrated in background than ‘uncivilized’ 
(Reicher, 2001). For example, qualitative and quantitative analyses of 
the 1960s US urban riots has shown that, far from being ‘riff-raff’, 
participants were representative of many others in society (Fogelson, 
1971) and that the individual attributes of rioters (their attitudes or 
supposed ‘disorder proneness’) were poor predictors of participation 
(McPhail, 1971). Against ‘submergence’ explanations, it has been 
established that anonymity in psychological crowds leads not to loss of 
control but to adherence to identity-based norms (Postmes & Spears, 
1998). Moreover, studies consistently find that, far from being 
indiscriminate, crowd violence is typically targeted, limited, and 
patterned (Fogelson, 1968; Reicher, 1984).  
                                                 
3 In a memorable dictum, Allport claimed that ‘the individual in the crowd behaves just as 
he would behave alone, only more so’ (Allport, 1924, p. 295). 
4 The Cabinet Office commissioned NatCen report on the August 2011 riots refers 
uncritically to de-individuation (see Morrell, Scott, McNeish, & Webster, 2011, p. 62). 
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rioters presents the events as unconnected to wider problems in 
society and thus allows the establishment to argue for law 
enforcement ‘solutions’ rather than accept the necessity of political 
change. Similarly, accounts depicting crowd action as mindless rather 
than meaningful place the crowd outside of ‘politics’ and rationalize 
coercion (Drury & Stott, 2011; Hoggett & Stott, 2010).  
The UK riots of August 2011 
The shooting by a police firearms unit of Mark Duggan in Tottenham, 
London, on the evening of August 4th 2011 precipitated four days of 
urban disturbances across the UK between Saturday 6th and Tuesday 
9th August. Beginning with a major disorder in Tottenham on the 
Saturday night, the ‘riots and looting’ spread across London over the 
following two days, and on the Monday evening appeared in several 
other cities including Birmingham, Liverpool, Leeds, Nottingham and 
Bristol. On the Tuesday afternoon and evening, whilst London 
remained fairly quiet, the disturbances developed across the west and 
east Midlands as well as appearing in Manchester, Salford, Leicester, 
Gloucester and again in Liverpool and Bristol. In all, it was estimated 
that 66 areas experienced 141 incidents of ‘disorder’ (Riots 
Communities and Victims Panel, 2011).  
The disturbances were not homogenous in either their form or 
content, with different repertoires of activity and patterns of targeting 
visible (Aufheben, 2011). The initial disorders in Tottenham and 
Hackney in London for example, can be described as ‘community riots’ 
where there was mass local participation with the principal targets 
being the police and their property (Aufheben, 2011; Reicher & Stott, 
2011). The majority of the incidents that followed were akin to 
‘commodity riots’ where the principal aim was to appropriate goods. In 
this case there was significant premeditation and communication, 
crowd mobility and selective targeting of commercial concentrations 
such as shopping centres and malls. There was also a sub-pattern 
involving the targeting of particular ‘wealthy areas’ in London (Ealing, 
Pimlico, Sloane Square, Notting Hill) which suffered widespread 
damage to property (and people). 
During the events, five people were killed, over 200 police officers were 
injured and there were 1,860 incidents of criminal damage and arson. 
The final ‘bill’ for damages, loss of trade and policing was estimated at 
£250-500 million (Riots Communities and Victims Panel, 2011).   
Radical Statistics    2012  
 
 7  
Figures used to suggest the convergence of 
individuals with uncivilized predispositions 
In this section, the content and use of statistical evidence concerning 
the August riots from government reports is reviewed and critiqued. 
The focus is on how the figures were interpreted to support ideas of 
predisposition, particularly in characterising participants as 
principally being ‘existing criminals’ or led by ‘gangs’. 
Statistics on ‘criminals’  
‘Criminal’ and ‘criminality’ were amongst the most frequently 
occurring words used to refer to the UK riots (Reicher & Stott, 2011). 
On the one hand, as a description of illegal activities the term 
‘criminal’ was clearly technically correct. On the other hand, a 
different kind of claim was made, particularly by senior politicians, 
when it was stated that most of those who took part already had 
criminal records and convictions.  
This kind of claim included statements about the ‘hardcore’ made by 
the Justice Secretary Kenneth Clarke in September 2011: 
‘It's not yet been widely recognised, but the hardcore of the 
rioters were in fact known criminals. Close to three quarters of 
those aged 18 or over charged with riot offences already had a 
prior conviction…In my view, the riots can be seen in part as an 
outburst of outrageous behaviour by the criminal classes – 
individuals and families familiar with the justice system, who 
haven't been changed by their past punishments.’5
About a week later he added that ‘existing criminals were on the 
rampage’
 
6
Home Secretary Theresa May continued with this characterization of 
the ‘majority’ in a speech given in December 2011: 
 
‘…three-quarters of those who appeared in court in connection 
with the riots already had a previous caution or conviction. On 
average each rioter charged had committed 11 previous 
offences. In other words, they were career criminals’7
Similarly: 
 
‘I think there are a number of issues here that we can only 
properly assess when we have a proper analysis of the people 
                                                 
5 http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/sep/05/kenneth-clarke-riots-penal-system 
6 http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/sep/15/english-riots-hardcore-repeat-
offenders?intcmp=239 
7http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2075540/Theresa-May-lessons-SHE-learnt-
weeks-LSE-report-summer-riots.html 18-12-2011 
Issue 106  Riotstats 
 
8 
who were involved in the riots ... But I am absolutely clear that 
what underlay it was criminality’8
Clarke’s terms ‘hardcore’ and ‘existing criminals’ convey the notion 
that even if ‘known criminals’ did not make up the numerical majority, 
they were at the heart of the events, or were most instrumental in 
what happened. In contrast, May’s statement about the ‘majority’ 
conflates those appearing before the courts with all those involved in 
the riots of August 2011. 
 
So what did the government statistics concerning arrestees and 
convictions suggest? Figure 1 displays the total number of persons 
arrested and the fraction brought to court nationwide as a result of 
the August riots in the three months following the cessation of the 
disturbances. It also shows the fractions of adults (>17 years old) and 
juveniles (aged 10-17) of those brought to court.9
The first noticeable feature of Figure 1 is the fact that more than 50% 
of those arrested were not brought to court by the middle of October 
2011. There are no statistics relating to how many of this majority 
fraction had previous convictions, so it is unclear if this group of 
arrestees were showing similar criminal histories to those who were 
brought to court.  
  
A related point concerns the rate of arrests. This was extremely high 
over the ten days immediately after the cessation of the disturbances, 
with almost three quarters of all those arrested in the three months 
following the riots apprehended in that short period. The police 
claimed to have 250,000 hours of CCTV footage as evidence. According 
to detectives, by February 7th 2012 six months after the August 
disturbances, they had only ‘studied’ in detail about four fifths of this 
total.10
 
 Taking a conservative estimate, by the middle of September 
2011, by which time the majority of arrests had been made, perhaps 
only one seventh of the footage had passed through this process. So 
how could so many arrests have been achieved so quickly? We will 
return to this important question later in this article. 
                                                 
8 (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 2011 (a) para.18) 
9 The data for this graph was obtained from Ministry of Justice (2011a,b,c). 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/10/london-riots-spark-copycat-birmingham, 
http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/riots-police-expect-to-make-3000-147645 and 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/dec/08/boy-riots-arrested-tv-cameras 
 
 
10 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-16875386 
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Figure 1: Persons arrested and/or brought to court (nationally) as 
a result of August riots since the cessation of the disturbances 
 
The second feature of Figure 1 is that as time went on the percentage 
of those brought to court that were adults decreased and the fraction 
of juveniles began to increase. Typically, juveniles have significantly 
fewer previous offences than adults and are thus less likely to be 
known to the police.11
 
 This fact alone may explain why it took some 
time for the police to track down juvenile suspects. This suggests in 
turn that a major factor in apprehending participants subsequent to 
the August events was previous criminal history, rather than the 
content of the crimes committed. 
                                                 
11 In the current population (2011), 28% of males aged 18-52 have a previous conviction, 
whilst the figure is only 2% for male juveniles (aged 10-17) (Ministry of Justice, 2011c. p. 7). 
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Figure 2: Previous criminal histories of those brought to court as 
a result of the August riots 
 
Figure 2 shows the fraction of those brought to court for the August 
disturbances with previous cautions and convictions (against time). It 
also shows for comparative purposes the statistics for all offenders 
brought to court for the 12 months up to March 2011.12
This suggests that while those taking part in the disorder 
were much more likely than the general population to have 
previous convictions, they are not quite as prolific as offenders 
sentenced for indictable offences in 2010/11
 The 
government statisticians interpreted this as follows: 
13
At face value, the results suggest that those brought before the courts 
in the aftermath were fairly characteristic of those who generally 
appear before the courts in a given year. Thus the inference is that the 
majority of participants in the August riots’ were already ‘criminals’. 
However, as is becoming clear, this interpretation of the data was 
seriously flawed. 
 
                                                 
12 The data for this graph was obtained from Ministry of Justice (2011a,b,c). 
13 Our emphasis in bold. The report contradicts this statement in its introduction by noting: 
‘the group of people brought before the courts is only a subset of all people who took part in 
the public disorder of 6th to 9th August 2011. It is therefore possible that there are differences 
between the people brought before the courts to date and all those who took part in the 
disorder’ (Ministry of Justice, 2011c, pp. 2, 7) 
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Several police sources indirectly drew attention to the problems in 
using these figures to characterise the composition of the ‘rioting’ 
crowds in August 2011. For example, the intense (government) 
pressure in the immediate aftermath of the disturbances to arrest 
‘suspects’ was used to explain the large number of cases of supposed 
mistaken identity and the failure to press charges: 
‘An official from the Metropolitan police, who asked not to be 
named, said that there were "extenuating circumstances" 
during and immediately after the disturbances, when police 
were under great pressure to "go out and arrest people while 
the evidence is still fresh"; because of the "sheer numbers" 
police were dealing with, it was inevitable that they were "not 
going to get the required evidence to charge all of them", the 
official said’14
Clearly, such pressure was leading to the path of least resistance in 
terms of sweeping up possible suspects. This involved concentrating 
on those who were already within police databases and/or under 
investigation and fitted the criminal profile of a potential ‘rioter’ or 
‘looter’ in a particular area. As we shall see, the use of CCTV evidence 
in the context of a rapid response to events was to bias the arrest 
statistics even further. 
 
Previous research on urban riots has pointed out that arrest or 
conviction figures neither necessarily reflects crowd composition nor 
‘riot’ severity (Cooper, 1985, p. 63; Keith, 1987, p. 97; Peach, 1986, 
pp. 397-398). In the August 2011 riots, the problem with assuming 
the characteristics of those arrested to represent the characteristics of 
those who took part was exacerbated by the police use of CCTV 
evidence. In order to demonstrate this point, the participants in the 
August 2011 riots (or in fact any recent urban disturbance) can be 
simply divided into four categories, based on two sets of criteria: (1) 
faces covered or uncovered; (2) previously known to the police or not 
known to the police. 
It is fairly obvious that the most likely group to be arrested in the 
immediate aftermath of a disturbance using CCTV footage as evidence 
are those whose faces were not covered and were previously known to 
the police. This is simply because having a CCTV image of a suspect is 
not much use if you don’t have an existing named photograph to 
compare it to. The second most likely group to be arrested were those 
who were not masked up but were unknown to the police. In this case 
the police were relied on members of the public who recognized them 
to provide the identification. The least likely category of participant to 
be identified were those whose faces were covered and were not 
                                                 
14 http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/dec/08/boy-riots-arrested-tv-cameras 
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previously known to the police. These categories are organised into a 
matrix illustrated in Table 1. 
 
 Known to police 
Not known to 
police 
Face 
uncovered 
Most likely to be 
identified 
Requires public 
identification 
Face covered Less likely to be identified 
Least likely to be 
identified 
 
Table 1: Likelihood of identification of riot participants by police 
analysis of CCTV footage 
 
Thus it is very likely that those who were arrested and/or charged, 
particularly in the immediate aftermath of the August riots, were 
primarily those with (extensive) criminal records whose faces were 
uncovered and secondly those who had no previous record but were 
unmasked. Consequently the effect of using CCTV evidence was to 
inherently bias the arrest and charging statistics towards the former 
group,15
The police authorities were aware of this phenomenon, and it was 
clearly stated during exchanges between the Acting Commissioner of 
the Metropolitan Police, Tim Godwin, and the Home Affairs Committee 
in early September 2011: 
 rather than the other three categories shown in Table 1. One 
government-sponsored report, ignoring this obvious circularity, 
blandly stated that ‘Nine out of ten [suspected rioters] were already 
known to the police’ (Riots communities and victims panel, 2011, p. 
11). 
Dr Huppert: ‘Whereas the Mayor was saying that most of the 
people involved were known to police and that we should be 
dealing with that group of people, you are saying that, in fact, 
that is just an artefact of the fact they are the first people you 
rounded up; is that correct?’ 
                                                 
15 Thirty years previously, during and after the urban disturbances in England in July and 
August 1981, nearly 4,000 people were arrested (Home Office, 1982 Table 1). Approximately 
61% of these had a previous criminal record, significantly lower than the figures for those 
brought to court as a result of the August 2011 riots. This may point to the effect of CCTV 
and on-going investigations into ‘gang members’ in directing police towards those suspects 
who are already known to them. 
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Tim Godwin: ‘That may well turn out to be the case, because 
we still have lots of images to go through and obviously the 
ones that you know are going to be arrested first.’16
Public statements that most rioters were already ‘criminals’ treated as 
unproblematic the circular way that the data was produced, with 
those already known to the police most likely to be identified and 
arrested. This simple statistical flaw did not restrain politicians from 
knowingly (or unknowingly) using the data to both characterize the 
August riots and define policy responses.
  
17
Statistics on ‘gangs’ 
  
The supposed mass involvement and organizational centrality of 
‘gangs’ in the disturbances was a major topic of debate both in 
government and the media in August 2011. It initially dominated 
supposed ‘explanations’ for the riots and appeared for a time to be 
directing policy.18 The gang ‘folk devil’ even began to take ethereal 
form as ‘gang culture’, an alien contagion which was driving ‘innocent’ 
youth to ‘riot’.19
There were early signs that statistical data was being sought by 
politicians to back up this account. For example, the Metropolitan 
police provided evidence to the Home Affairs Committee in August 
2011 that 28% of those arrested in London were ‘gang members’
 
20
                                                 
16 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2011b, Q93) 
. 
This is a significant figure and seemed to support the earlier 
statements by the Prime Minister and other cabinet members that 
17 For example, the Justice Secretary Kenneth Clarke proposed in September 2011, on the 
basis that the rioters were ‘hardcore criminals’, ‘radical changes to focus our penal system 
relentlessly on proper, robust punishment and the reduction of reoffending.’ 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/sep/05/punishment-rioters-help. 
18 ‘David Cameron has announced he will extend US-style gang injunctions as he claimed 
there was clear evidence that gangs had been at the heart of some of the violence in Britain's 
cities in recent days. He said he believed they had co-ordinated some of the attacks on police’. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/11/uk-riots-gang-crackdown. He also called on 
help from the US: ‘America's most fearsome policeman [Bill Bratton] has been appointed 
David Cameron's top adviser on gang warfare’ http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2024946/UK-riots-Bill-Bratton-advise-David-Cameron-gang-warfare.html.  
19 The Prime Minister emphasised this view in a speech to the House of Commons on 11th 
August: ‘This is not about poverty, it's about culture. A culture that glorifies violence, shows 
disrespect to authority, and says everything about rights but nothing about responsibilities…. 
At the heart of all the violence sits the issue of the street gangs. Territorial, hierarchical and 
incredibly violent, they are mostly composed of young boys, mainly from dysfunctional 
homes.’ http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-14492789 
20 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2011b; reply to Q84). The definition of a 
‘gang member’ or ‘affiliate’ is unclear; the Home Affairs Committee even stated categorically: 
‘The Home Secretary should clarify what the Home Office means by the term in the context of 
the August disorder and the methodology used to establish whether a particular individual 
was “affiliated to a gang”’  
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‘gangs’ had orchestrated the events in London at least. However, by 
early September, the Home Secretary was wavering: 
‘Mrs May told the Home Affairs Committee on Thursday that 
the Metropolitan Police and other forces were looking at the 
number of people arrested with known gang affiliations - the 
percentage of which had fallen over time, as total arrests had 
risen’21
The publication of comprehensive statistics by the Home Office in 
October 2011 demonstrated the extent of the statistical variation over 
time: 
 
‘Overall 13 per cent of arrestees (417) were reported to be 
affiliated to a gang. Outside London, the majority of forces 
identified fewer than ten per cent of all arrestees as gang 
members…In London, 19 per cent of arrestees were identified 
as gang members – the joint highest of any force – and the 
number of gang members arrested in London (337) is far 
greater than those arrested in all other forces combined’22
The report went on to state that: 
 
‘In terms of the role gangs played in the disorder, most [Police] 
forces perceived that where gang members were involved, 
they generally did not play a pivotal role’ 
The key points to note here are that the sample studied was arrestees, 
that the percentage of ‘gang members’ fell as more arrests were made 
and that the London area had the highest fractions of supposed ‘gang’ 
membership.  
The inherent circularity demonstrated earlier in this paper in the data 
concerning ‘criminals’ also biased these statistics. The reactions of 
government ministers in the immediate aftermath of August directed 
the police (chiefly in London) to focus on ‘gangs’ as the perpetrators of 
the violence. As a result, they arrested large numbers of gang 
members and ‘affiliates’ who were known to them, particularly in the 
first few weeks after the disturbances. Consequently, the percentages 
of ‘known gang members’ dominated the early arrest figures and thus 
provided the supposed empirical evidence for the statements issued by 
the politicians. 
This circularity was understood to an extent by the Acting 
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police who stated in giving evidence 
to the Home Affairs Committee in September: 
                                                 
21 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-14834827 
22 Home Office (2011, p. 5). 
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‘Most of the gang members we do in fact know. Most of the 
gang members we have active investigations against, so they 
were the ones that we scooped up first off, which is why the 
percentage was higher at the beginning’23
An even more fundamental statistical anomaly was not even addressed 
by these commentators, that of ‘arrestees’ as opposed to those 
‘convicted’. It is unclear how many arrested ‘gang members’ were 
actually charged (or convicted). If the government had argued, for 
example, that traffic wardens were orchestrating the riots, it might be 
expected that a number of them would be arrested under suspicion 
and questioned. However, it certainly would be foolish to use these 
distorted arrest statistics to back up arguments that traffic wardens 
planned or led the riots. 
 
Figures used to suggest rioters’ behaviour was 
affected by submergence 
The claim that when people are in crowds they lose control of their 
senses and their behaviour, and therefore commit acts of irrational 
and indiscriminate violence, was implicit in the suggestion made by 
commentators that rioters were ‘destroying their own community.’ 
Politicians and journalists, during and after the unrest, emphasised 
the damage and loss to ‘local shops’ and to ‘family businesses’, as well 
as the effects of arson on private properties. Most of the initial 
interviews that were conducted in the media concentrated on non-
chain local retailers and on those who had lost their homes. The 
impression of indiscriminate or gratuitous destruction was prevalent 
in these (mostly anecdotal) reports.  
The most comprehensive data to be produced concerning the 
commercial properties that were targeted was published at the end of 
October 2011 by the Home Office.24
Among the most detailed media coverage of the events of August 2011 
was that by The Guardian. In line with a ‘social deprivation’ 
explanation, it suggested in its early reporting that the damage to 
property was largely the targeting of large stores. By the time it 
published Reading the riots, however, the Guardian interpreted these 
Home Office figures as evidence of a bloody-minded attack by rioters 
‘on their own community’. Thus, while acknowledging that ‘many 
rioters repeated the claim local businesses were deliberately spared’, 
 Figure 3 displays this tabular data 
graphically. 
                                                 
23 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2011b; reply to Q87). 
24 Home Office (2011, Table 6, p.14) 
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the paper concluded: ‘the truth was that many local businesses – some 
of which were deeply rooted in their community – were targeted.’25
 
  
 
Figure 3: Types of commercial premises targeted nationwide in 
the August disorders26
 
 
However, the ‘small independent retailers’ category, so beloved of the 
media and politicians in the aftermath of August 2011, and which is 
taken uncritically by the Guardian to be synonymous with ‘local 
businesses’, actually makes up a small minority - 9% - of the 2,278 
commercial properties that were attacked in total. It is also apparent 
that the vast majority of properties were targeted in order to obtain 
                                                 
25 http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/dec/05/morality-of-rioters-summer-riots Our 
emphasis. 
26 Notes on target types in Figure 3: 1. Includes electrical hardware, mobile phone, and 
digital media retailers (computer games, music CDs, DVDs). 2. Includes general/fashion 
clothing and sportswear retailers. 3. Includes convenience shops, newsagents and off 
licences. 4. Includes charity shops, pawn shops, pharmacies and car salerooms. 5. Includes 
restaurants, fast food outlets and cafés. 6. Includes banks, building societies, exchanges 
and cheque cashiers. 7. Includes miscellaneous services such as estate agents and post 
offices. 
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goods and cash, with electrical and clothing shops alone making up 
22% of the total. Clearly, there was significant selectivity of targets 
rather than indiscriminate destruction. 
Perhaps more importantly, these comprehensive national figures, and 
in particular the way the data is categorized, may hide some specific 
superordinate discrimination defined by locality, which isn’t obvious 
simply by counting the types of property damaged without reference to 
its geographical context. In particular, there were targeted attacks on 
‘wealthy areas’ in Ealing, Pimlico, Sloane Square and Notting Hill 
(Aufheben, 2011). What marked these particular events was the 
widespread destruction of commercial properties and cars which, 
within those districts, was far less selective and clearly not based 
purely on appropriation of commodities. One journalist described the 
scene in Ealing in comparison to other incidents of London he had 
observed that night: ‘There were parts of Ealing where every single 
shop had been attacked, and every car set on fire’27
This discriminating-indiscrimination deserves further investigation and 
may have significantly biased the numbers of ‘small independent 
retailers’ that were attacked. In line with this analysis that it was an 
attack on wealth, it is clear from cursory analysis of photographs
 
28
But what of the claims concerning the destruction of private 
dwellings? The iconic images of burning buildings in London that 
mesmerised the nation in August were used by some sections of the 
media to spin a story of random attacks by ‘looters’ and ‘rioters’ on 
peoples’ homes.
 
that the boutiques, wine bars and specialist shops of these wealthy 
havens were in general wrecked rather than looted by the participants, 
who travelled to these particular localities. 
29
Take for example the figure of ‘at least 100 families are thought to have 
been made homeless by arson and looting’
 These ‘human interest’ stories, which portrayed 
‘innocent victims’ preyed on by ‘feral arsonists’ were central to the 
narrative of psychopathic behaviours amongst the participants. 
However, extensive analysis of the targets of the arsonists and ‘rioters’ 
in August has demonstrated that there were very few (if any) deliberate 
attacks on private homes.  
30
                                                 
27 
 which was quoted in 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/12/uk-riots-paul-lewis-five-day-
journey?INTCMP=SRCH 
28 The variety of targets is obvious in this collection of photos: 
https://picasaweb.google.com/106393364195414121585/20110808WestEalingAndEaling
Riots 
29 Example: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2023964/London-riots-2011-
Tottenham-residents-flee-burning-homes.html 
30 http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/11/families-homeless-riots-compensated 
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several sources immediately after the August events. On closer 
examination this figure relates only two ‘riot’ locations in London; 55 
private homes in Croydon and 45 in Tottenham.31
It appears from the evidence that peoples’ homes were not the primary 
or even secondary targets for arson by ‘looters and rioters’ across the 
capital and the country; instead these incidents were more likely to be 
cases of collateral damage. 
 Of these 100 
properties, 26 lay above the Carpetright shop in Tottenham and the 
majority (if not all) in Croydon were damaged by a single fire set in the 
Reeves Furniture Store to which they were adjacent.  
Discussion 
Government ministers and others used problematic arrest and court 
statistics, biased by circularity inherent in the rapid apprehension of 
suspects already known to police, to claim that typically the rioters 
were ‘career criminals’ and ‘gang’ members. Thus figures were used to 
suggest that rioters were distinguished from others in society by their 
lack of civilization, an argument which clearly echoes discredited 
‘convergence’ explanations for violent crowd behaviour. Echoing 
academic ‘submergence’ accounts, according to which people in 
crowds lose their senses and their self-control, commentators also 
suggested that rioters were indiscriminate, ‘damaged their own 
community’, and made bloody-minded attacks on ordinary people’s 
homes. But the methods of counting the data used to support these 
claims failed to differentiate cases where properties were damaged in 
targeted attacks on rich areas; and most of the data on damage to 
homes was from a relatively small number of incidents. 
Attempts by government ministers and others to claim that the rioters 
were criminals by predisposition, or that their actions were mindless, 
were not just neutral descriptions. They were intended as explanations 
with practical implications. Indeed, in offering such explanations the 
ministers were explicitly attacking competing explanations for the 
events. Specifically, when the prime minister and home secretary 
argued that the figures showed that the problem was ‘culture’ and that 
the rioters were a small group of ‘career criminals’, they were clearly 
rejecting explanations in terms of either government austerity 
measures (Taylor-Gooby, 2012) or police practices of stop and search 
(Guardian, 2011). If the rioters are an unrepresentative and tiny 
                                                                                                                                                        
In fact only 61 families required long-term alternative housing in London where the bulk of 
the arson occurred (Riots communities and victims panel, 2011, p. 26). 
31 Only two other locations of private homes damaged by fire were mentioned in the 
sources, these were Southwark (London) and Birmingham where one household was 
affected in each case. http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/11/families-homeless-
riots-compensated 
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minority who are prone to behave that way anyway, and if what 
happened during the events was just a meaningless outburst, there is 
no need to change government policy or policing practices; rather, the 
‘solution’ is to arrest those who are ‘riot-prone’ and to limit mass 
gatherings, perhaps through curfews.  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to outline an alternative theoretical 
account of the August 2011 riots to the discredited and ideological 
‘convergence’ and ‘submergence’ explanations. However, we note that 
the only existing psychological study of the events in Tottenham and 
Hackney (Reicher & Stott, 2011) concurs with contemporary 
theoretical analyses not only in social psychology (Reicher, 2001) but 
also in historiography, sociology, and political science (e.g., Adams, 
1992; Feagin & Hahn, 1973; Waddington, 1992; Walton & Seddon, 
1994). Across these literatures, there is agreement on the following 
points. First, events such as riots are best understood as intergroup 
relationships, typically between a crowd and the police. Second, this 
relationship is characterized by changing perceptions of power and 
legitimacy. Third, the contours of collective violence (or non-violence) 
in crowd events reflect the contours of collective identity.  
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